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Abstract
In “Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game”, Rae Langton and Caro-
line West borrow ideas from David Lewis to attempt to explain how pornography
might subordinate and silence women. Pornography is supposed to express cer-
tain misogynistic claims implicitly, through presupposition, and to convey them
indirectly, through accommodation. I argue that the appeal to accommodation
cannot do the sort of work Langton and West want it to do: Their case rests
upon an overly simplified model of that phenomenon. I argue further that, once
we are clear about why Langton and West’s account fails, a different and more
plausible account of pornography’s influence emerges.
According to Catharine A. MacKinnon (1993), pornography subor-
dinates and silences women. Precisely what that might mean is far
from obvious, and some authors (e.g. Parent, 1990) have argued that
MacKinnon’s view is incoherent. In a series of now well-known papers,
however, Rae Langton has developed an interpretation of MacKinnon’s
claims that has struck many as promising: Pornography, or at least quite
a lot of it,1 subordinates women by establishing such socio-political ‘facts’
as that women’s consent to sex is not required, and it silences women by
∗Forthcoming in Inquiry
1 Although MacKinnon uses the term “pornography” in a ‘thick’ sense, Langton does
not always seem to follow her in this regard (see e.g. Langton, 1998, p. 92, esp. fn. 7). I
myself prefer to use the term in a morally and politically neutral way, as seems more
common in ordinary discourse: as applying, roughly, to sexually explicit media that, in
some sense, and to some significant extent, is intended to facilitate sexual arousal in
those who engage with it. (I doubt that any satisfying conceptual analysis is possible, but
that only makes “pornography” like most other words.) That said, I’ll not be particularly
careful in what follows about when I’m talking about pornography quite generally and
when I’m talking just about what we might call “misogynistic pornography”. Context
should make that clear enough.
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establishing, for example, that a woman’s “No” is not always a refusal,
at least in a sexual context.
It is as essential to Langton’s view as it is to MacKinnon’s that
pornography establishes such ‘facts’, and not just in a causal sense:
Pornography is supposed to “make[] women socially inferior” (L&W, p.
306, my emphasis)2 and to “make certain actions—refusal and protest—
unspeakable for women in certain contexts” (Langton, 1993, p. 324, my
emphasis). Liberal ‘defenders’ of pornography have often been willing
to grant that (a lot of) pornography communicates and even spreads
despicable attitudes. But they regard such consequences as lamentable
effects of pornography’s regrettable success in the ‘marketplace of ideas’:
Somehow, it manages to convince its audience to adopt the views about
gender and sexuality that it expresses (see e.g. Cohen, 1996; Strossen,
2000). Langton, by contrast, argues that pornography does not just
express or assert such claims but performs a different sort of speech act
that establishes the truth of what it expresses: like when an umpire says
“Out!” or a judge says “I find the defendant guilty”. These are speech acts
of the sort that J. L. Austin (1962, pp. 152–4) called ‘verdictives’.
As Langton would later concede, however, pornography does not fit
the classic Austinian model: “Its speakers do not officially, and authori-
tatively say, for example, ‘I hereby subordinate’. . . ”. There is thus a need
for a supplement that explains how pornographic speech might “nonethe-
less work in ways that are comparable to classic Austinian illocutions”
(Langton, 2012, pp. 82–3). Providing such a supplement is one goal of the
paper “Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game”, which Langton
wrote with Caroline West. Their proposal is that pornography works its
black magic through what David Lewis (1979) called ‘accommodation’.
According to Langton and West (L&W), the stories that pornography
tells presuppose certain ‘facts’ about gender and sexuality, such as that
women enjoy being raped. It is not that such claims are asserted explic-
itly, any more than someone who says “I wonder whether Jean regrets
voting for Smith” explicitly asserts that Jean voted for Smith. But the
stories pornography tells, L&W claim, make little sense if one tries to
interpret them against a background in which it is assumed instead that
women do not enjoy being raped (L&W, p. 312). In ‘reading’ pornography,
then, one is forced to take its presuppositions on board, to ‘accommo-
date’ them, as Lewis would have us say. Pornography thus expresses its
2 References marked “L&W” are to Langton and West (1999).
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misogynistic attitudes implicitly, through presupposition, and conveys
them indirectly, through accommodation.
There is nothing in this account so far to which a liberal ‘defender’
of pornography need object. As noted above, many of Langton’s oppo-
nents would agree that pornography expresses misogynistic attitudes
about gender and sexuality and that it sometimes succeeds in instilling
those atittudes in its audience. It is in response to such opponents that
L&W attempt to show that certain features of presupposition and ac-
commodation can help us to understand how pornography might, once
again, “work in ways that are comparable to classic Austinian illocu-
tions” (Langton, 2012, pp. 82–3), making women socio-sexually inferior
by decree.
In the paragraph before the one from which I just quoted, Langton
seems to describe her goal more modestly: to show how “pornography
might have the illocutionary force of altering norms and social conditions,
by legitimating, or advocating, certain beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour”
(Langton, 2012, p. 82). Once again, there is much in that formulation
with which Langton’s liberal opponents could agree: They agree that
pornography alters norms and social conditions by affecting people’s
beliefs and other attitudes; they very explicitly also think that it does
so by advocating for those norms; etc. What makes Langton’s view
different is the claim that these effects are due to pornography’s having
a special illocutionary force: Her claim is that pornography works like
an Austinian performative and makes women socio-sexually inferior
just by saying that they are. The particular suggestion that L&W are
making is that it does so through the mechanisms of presupposition and
accommodation.3
I will be arguing that accommodation cannot do the work that L&W
want it to do. The underlying difficulty is that they operate with a
simplified model of presupposition that elides certain subtleties. In many
settings, these do not matter, so many philosophical discussions operate
with the same simplified model. In the present context, however, what
the simplified model omits turns out to be crucial.
We’ll proceed as follows. In section 1, we will review the notions
of presupposition and accommodation. We will then briefly discuss, in
3 Both Jennifer Saul (2006b) and Louise Antony (2011) raise serious questions about
whether pornography is sufficiently like speech for tools borrowed from speech act
theory usefully to be applied to it. I’m sympathetic, especially where photographic and
cinematic pornography are concerned (cf. Bauer, 2015, pp. 85–6), but I’ll here grant L&W
this assumption.
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section 2, what L&W think pornography presupposes and so is able to
convey through accommodation. That done, we’ll consider, in section 3,
some initial questions about the role L&W take accommodation to play,
so as to bring that role into better focus. The core of the paper is section 4,
which argues that it is far less clear than L&W suppose why pornogra-
phy’s presuppositions should persist beyond the local context in which
they are introduced. But Langton has elsewhere endorsed the claim that
pornography has a certain sort of authority concerning matters of gender
and sexuality, and it is natural to suggest that this is what is supposed
to explain the persistence of the presuppositions it introduces. I consider
this proposal in section 5 and argue that Langton conflates two notions
of authority. Once they are disentangled, a different and more plausible
model of how pornography might influence its viewers emerges. We’ll
discuss that model in section 6.
1 Presupposition and Accommodation
The notion of presupposition that is relevant to this discussion is what
Robert Stalnaker (1970) called pragmatic presupposition. Before Stal-
naker, presupposition was typically regarded as a ‘logical’ relation be-
tween a sentence and a proposition. Thus, Sir Peter Strawson (1950)
famously argued that the sentence “The King of France is bald” presup-
poses that France has a king: If France has no king, then, or so Strawson
tells us, the sentence has no truth-value. Since one’s assertive utterances
ought at least to be truth-evaluable, a sentence’s presuppositions came
to be seen as ‘felicity conditions’ on its utterance: One ought not utter a
sentence whose presuppositions are not satisfied.
Stalnaker, by contrast, argued that the more fundamental notion is
what someone presupposes. It would be better, on his account, to say
that a person who assertively utters “The King of France is bald” makes
it manifest that they are presupposing that France has a king. And, in so
far as this sentence has a ‘felicity condition’, it is not that France should
have a king but rather that it should be mutually presupposed, among
the parties to whatever conversation is under way, that France has a
king. These mutual presuppositions constitute what would later come to
be called the ‘common ground’ of the conversation (cf. Stalnaker, 2002).
It was already realized in the early 1970s, however, that there are
plenty of cases in which it is perfectly all right to utter a sentence even
though its felicity conditions, in this sense, are not satisfied (Karttunen,
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1974; Stalnaker, 1974). I might say to you, “I wonder whether Jean
regrets voting for Smith”, knowing full well that you do not know for
whom Jean voted. But now you do know: You assume that I am aware
what my utterance presupposes; you can therefore infer that I am myself
presupposing that Jean voted for Smith; and, not seeing any reason
not to do so, you join me. As Lewis (1979, p. 339) puts it, “Say some-
thing that requires a missing presupposition, and straightaway that
presupposition springs into existence. . . ”, at least assuming that one’s
conversational partners do not object. This is the process that Lewis
called accommodation.
Lewis (1979, pp. 344ff) himself speaks of there being a rule of accom-
modation, which he suggests may be a constitutive rule that partially
defines what conversation is, much as the rules of chess define what
chess is. Stalnaker (2002, §§3–5), by contrast, argues that there is
no such rule and that accommodation is the result of broadly Gricean
principles concerning the co-operative nature of conversation, an idea
further developed by Mandy Simons (2003). Fortunately, we will not
need to decide this issue here. I mention it only to deflect, in advance,
any objection based upon a conception of accommodation as a ‘rule’. It
would surely be a mistake for L&W (or their sympathizers) to commit
themselves to Lewis’s particular view on this matter, since the issue
remains unresolved (and certainly seems to be independent).4
We can now understand better what model L&W are proposing. Lang-
ton is more explicit about it in a later paper, parts of which were already
quoted above:
Unlike the speech of a legislator, . . . pornography [is] not usu-
ally spoken by officials uttering classic Austinian illocutions.
Its speakers do not officially, and authoritatively say, for exam-
ple, ‘I hereby subordinate [women]’. . . . Such speech acts work
more subtly. They may implicitly presuppose certain facts
and norms, rather than explicitly enacting them; but these
implicit presuppositions may nonetheless work in ways that
are comparable to classic Austinian illocutions. Consumers
then change their factual and normative beliefs by taking on
4 Although L&W (pp. 309–10) do tend to speak as if there were a ‘rule’ of accommo-
dation, they do not, so far as I can see, actually rely upon that claim. But Mary Kate
McGowan, whose work I will discuss in section 4.2, does seem to do so. See note 27 and
the text to which it is attached. (That said, it will be evident in what follows that I tend
to agree with Stalnaker about this matter.)
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board the ‘common ground’ (in Robert Stalnaker’s phrase),
or the ‘conversational score’ (in David Lewis’s phrase) that
is presupposed in the pornographic ‘conversation’. (Langton,
2012, pp. 82–3, emphasis original)
Note the role that is played here by “taking [the presuppositions] on
board”, that is, by accommodation. This is what allows the “pragmatic
story”, as Langton calls it, to “explain how speech can alter beliefs rather
directly” (Langton, 2012, p. 84). Pornography that makes misogynistic
presuppositions alters the common ground of the ‘conversations’ that
occur when it is viewed, adding those presuppositions to it through the
mechanism of accommodation.5 But, Langton tells us, “. . . altering the
shared ‘common ground’ just is altering the shared ‘common belief ’ ”
(Langton, 2012, p. 84, emphasis original). These new beliefs will then
“persist in. . . conversations with real women” (L&W, p. 313), in particular,
in sexual interactions that men who have viewed misogynistic pornogra-
phy have with women, something that turns out not to be so good for
those women.6
In what follows, I am going to argue that the ‘pragmatic story’ is
undermined by complexities of which L&W fail to take sufficient notice.
The claim that pornography presupposes certain misogynistic facts that
viewers must then accommodate does not, I will claim, help us to under-
stand how pornography might have the sorts of effects that L&W claim
it does. First, though, it will be worth discussing, at least briefly, what
sorts of presuppositions L&W think pornography makes.
5 One might wonder whether this is true, even if we set aside cases in which the
presuppositions are consciously rejected. Couldn’t someone look at “Dirty Pool” (see
below) and just be aroused by the photographs, without paying any attention at all to
the story? If so, then its misogynistic presuppositions never get added to the common
ground. But Langton needn’t hold that those presuppositions are always added, only
that, if someone is paying attention to the story, then they will get added. That would be
enough for pornography to be able to silence women in some cases—though how many
cases would be an open question.
6 Most philosophers who discuss pornography focus exclusively upon heterosexual
pornography and its effect upon heterosexual relations. That is regrettable, for a
variety of reasons, but L&W are no exception, so I’ll focus on that case here. Edward
D. Miller (2012) is an exception. Petra van Brabandt (2017) also discusses some queer
pornography, though of a very artsy sort (see also van Brabandt and Prinz, 2012).
Outside philosophy, much more attention is paid to such material. See, for example,
Patton (1991), Beirne (2012), Ryberg (2015), Young (2017), and especially the now-classic
Dyer (1985), which might well be regarded as birthing serious academic engagement
with cinematic pornography.
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2 What Does Pornography Presuppose?
L&W make some very strong claims about what pornography presup-
poses, namely, that “. . . ‘Gang rape is enjoyable for men’, or ‘Gang rape is
enjoyable for women’ or ‘Sexual violence is legitimate’. . . ” (L&W, p. 312).
These specific claims are made about a somewhat infamous pictorial,
“Dirty Pool”, that was published in Hustler magazine in January 1983,
though L&W insist that this pictorial “is in many ways typical” (L&W, p.
311, n. 20). But L&W’s interpretation of this particular pictorial might
be questioned (see Heck, 2020a, §4), even if it had not been borrowed
from an anti-pornography slideshow produced by a political organization
with a definite agenda.7
Still, there certainly have been pornographic films that, at least
arguably, make the sorts of presuppositions L&W mention. One example
is Behind the Green Door, which was directed by the Mitchell Brothers
and released in 1972. Gloria (played by Marilyn Chambers) has been
abducted and taken to some sort of sex club. As a mime warms up the
crowd, Gloria is prepared for what is to happen to her. Six women lead
her onto the stage, and an announcement is made to the audience:8
Ladies and gentlemen, you are about to witness the ravish-
ment of a woman who has been abducted. A woman whose
initial fear and anxiety has mellowed into curious expectation.
Although at first her reactions may lead you to believe that
she is being tortured, quite the contrary is true. For no harm
will come to those being ravished. In the morning, she will
be set free, unaware of anything except that she has been
loved as never before. . . . So, with the knowledge that you
are powerless to stop the performance, just relax and enjoy
yourself to the fullest extent.
7 L&W’s characterization of the pictorial is taken from a paper by Catherine Itzin
(1992, p. 30), who, in turn, is simply quoting a presentation developed by the group
Organizing Against Pornography. According to the Minnesota Historical Society (2019),
this group, which was founded in 1984 as the Pornography Resource Center, “was
actively involved in the passage by the Minneapolis City Council of an anti-pornography
ordinance, which had been prepared by Catharine MacKinnon in 1983”.
8 My attention was drawn to Green Door by Linda Williams’s discussion of it (Williams,
1989, pp. 156–60). As it happens, Williams does not get the announcement quite right.
It is not easy to understand. I had to listen to it several times, and I’m still not sure I’ve
got it right.
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In fact, Gloria is still ‘reluctant’ when her ‘ravishment’ begins, but she
is soon overcome by her own arousal and before long seems to be parti-
cipating enthusiastically. Arguably, then, Green Door does presuppose
the rape myth that women, even when initially ‘reluctant’ to engage in
sexual activity, will sometimes enjoy themselves in the end.9
Whether very much contemporary pornography makes such presup-
postions is obviously an empirical question, however, and my own view
is that hardly any does (Heck, 2020a, §3). But, for our purposes here,
we can set the question aside. Although there is plenty of pornography
nowadays that is, or so I would argue, not particularly sexist, it is also
true that there is quite a lot of mainstream pornography that is sexist (to
a greater or lesser degree), and I strongly suspect that such pornography
helps perpetuate sexism (and, indeed, other forms of oppression). So
it’s a nice question whether the notion of accommodation might help us
understand how pornography effects harm, even if it turns out to do so
in ways more subtle than by propogating rape myths.
For the sake of argument, then, I’ll assume henceforth that the sorts
of presuppositions L&W claim to find in pornography—ones concerning
the legitimacy of sexual coercion, for example—are indeed widespread.10
3 How Much Accommodation?
There’s an obvious sort of worry about L&W’s analysis, one I’ve encoun-
tered several times in conversation (and in teaching their paper). As
we’ll see, this worry is misplaced, but discussing it will help us better to
understand the role that accommodation plays in L&W’s account. More
importantly, doing so will help us to isolate what I take to be the crucial
question about their account.
Suppose that Fred has never before watched pornography. One day,
though, he decides to watch Behind the Green Door and so is forced to
accommodate the film’s misogynistic presuppositions. A few days later,
Fred watches Joy, a 1975 film that, according to Linda Williams (1989, p.
165), “begins with the rape of a high school virgin who. . . yells out at her
9 Darren Kerr (2012) has argued for a more progressive reading of Green Door, but I’ll
not interrogate the more common reading here.
10 For what it’s worth, I am far from sure that the notion of presupposition is very
helpful in this context, but I’ll not challenge that aspect of L&W’s position here. I’ll
note, however, that the account given in section 6 need not assume that pornography
presupposes, say, that anal sex does not require special consent.
8
attackers as they flee that she wants ‘more’. . . ”.11 The presuppositions
this film makes look very much like the ones Green Door (allegedly)
makes. If so, however, then those presuppositions are already in place,
and Fred will not need to accommodate them.
This is just one example, of course, but it generalizes, because the
sorts of presuppositions (we’re assuming) that pornography makes have
to be very general if they’re to be widespread, and they need to be
widespread if pornography is to have the sorts of effects L&W claim it
does. But then it’s unclear how large a role accommodation can really
play: Once you’ve watched one film, you’ve already been forced to accom-
modate its presuppositions; you don’t need to accommodate them again
when you watch the next one.
But L&W can readily agree that pornography’s presuppositions will
only need to be accommodated initially.12 Indeed, L&W’s view is explic-
itly that misogynistic attitudes are both “introduced and reinforced by
pornography” (L&W, p. 314, my emphasis). They are introduced when
Fred first watches Green Door. And it seems as if L&W can happily allow,
too, that it may take more than one film for Fred really to get the mes-
sage that pornography is speaking.13 Eventually, though, Fred will get it.
Once he’s got it, that doesn’t mean the message is no longer there, that
is, that the presuppositions are no longer made, nor even that they no
longer have an effect. They may not now be so noticeable, because they
fit so easily with what Fred takes himself already to know, and thus seem
to confirm it. That, then, is the way in which pornography reinforces
its misogynistic presuppositions, functioning after those presuppositions
have been accommodated more as a reminder than as a news flash.
One might, however, still want to insist that L&W very much need to
claim that pornography is, at least often, responsible for introducing such
presuppositions. Their view, remember, is that pornography “in some
sense makes women socially inferior, and makes sexual violence normal
and legitimate” (L&W, p. 306, my emphasis). But suppose that the sorts
of socio-sexual norms that pornography presupposes were independently
11 I have not seen this film but am prepared to accept Williams’s description of it.
12 Accommodation is (and was originally introduced as) the exceptional case. Ordinarily,
the presuppositions of one’s utterances are antecedently in place. The mistake was to
think that they always are.
13 There is apparently a very different notion of accommodation, used in sociology and
related fields, on which it can take a very long time for something to be accommodated.
To be sure, L&W clearly have Lewis’s model in mind, and Lewis-style accommodation is
supposed to be all but instantaneous. But it needs argument that they cannot be more
flexible. (Thanks to Jason Stanley here.)
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prevalent in the culture. Then pornography would, for the most part,
only serve to reinforce attitudes that people had acquired before they
encountered it. In that case, we presumably would not wish to say, with
MacKinnon, that pornography subordinated and silenced women but
only that it helped to sustain other social structures that did so. That
would be a bad thing, no doubt, but it would be a very different bad thing.
And the sorts of socio-sexual norms that L&W claim pornography
presupposes are independently prevalent in our culture. Consider, for
example, the myth that women often refuse sex they actually intend
to have.14 This is hardly part of an ideology that is special to, or that
originated with, pornography. On the contrary, such attitudes are as
widely presupposed in other forms of popular culture as they are in
pornography, and they have been for a very long time.15 The fact that
Fred has never before watched a pornographic film therefore gives us
no reason to suppose that he has not previously been exposed to, and
already absorbed, the sorts of presuppositions made by misogynistic
pornography. The point here is not just the familiar one that sexism
long pre-dates pornography. Rather, the point is that there is no easy
path from claims about what pornography presupposes to the claim that
pornography ever introduces those presuppositions.
To put the point differently, the cultural ubiquity of the norms that
pornography (allegedly) presupposes makes it far from obvious why it
should have any special role in getting viewers to accept those norms.
On the contrary, it seems likely that there are complex interactions
between pornography, other forms of popular media, and other sources
of socio-sexual norms (such as religious and cultural traditions), all of
which have a role to play. Maybe pornography is especially efficacious,
its sexually explicit character making the attitudes it presupposes seem
to have a special urgency. But why sexually explicit media should be a
particularly effective messenger seems to be little discussed, either in
philosophy or elsewhere.16
14 There’s an interesting history to empirical work on this particular myth. Nicola
Gavey (2005, esp. Ch. 2) discusses it at some length. I argue elsewhere that this work
casts serious doubt upon the claim that pornography silences women, at least as Langton
understands that claim (Heck, 2020a, §2).
15 Margaret Jackson (1984) discusses the ubiquity of such myths in sex advice books,
and sex research, in the early twentieth century. Going much further back, A. W. Eaton
(2012a) discusses the eroticization of rape in renaissance painting.
16 Langton (2017, p. 25) claims that pornography “works in part by harnessing the
power of sexual desire, arousal, and orgasm”, but she does not explain how. Gail Dines,
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I confess that, for a time, I thought that the line of argument just
rehearsed seriously undermined L&W’s claim that pornography ‘makes’
women socio-sexually inferior. But it doesn’t. Even if the problematic
norms are culturally ubiquitous, that does not imply that pornography
does not, in some important sense, ‘establish’ those norms by introducing
them into the common ground of pornographic conversations. Suppose
that Fred has somehow managed to free himself from the sorts of rape
myths prevalent in our culture. One day, though, he foolishly decides to
watch Behind the Green Door. In order to engage with the film, Fred must
accommodate its misogynistic presuppositions. Otherwise, the film would
make no sense. Just watching the film thus threatens to undo all Fred’s
hard work. So what misogynistic pornography does, on this account, is
inevitably to pull its viewers into a world in which sexual violence is
normal and legitimate, re-establishing such norms for them, whenever
that should need doing, and reinforcing them otherwise. To be precise,
then, what we should say is probably that misogynistic pornography
helps to maintain those norms, however they were originally established,
and thereby helps maintain the patriarchy.
Whether such norms also have other sources would thus seem to be
irrelevant to the question whether pornography “makes sexual violence
normal and legitimate” (L&W, p. 306). It is easy to hear that claim as:
Pornography is what makes sexual violence normal and legitimate. So
read, the claim implies that sexual violence would not be normal and
legitimate but for pornography. But, in fact, nothing prevents L&W from
conceding that other things also legitimate sexual violence. To be sure,
there is a familiar sort of anti-pornography rhetoric that tends to give a
different impression—pornography is the root of all misogyny—and it is
an old complaint that anti-pornography feminists overstate the role that
a sociologist, frequently alludes to the special efficacy of sexually explicit media, for
example, in this passage:
By the time they first encounter porn, most men have internalized the
sexist ideology of our culture, and porn, rather than being an aberration,
actually cements and consolidates their ideas about sexuality. And it does
this in a way that gives them intense sexual pleasure. This framing of
sexist ideology as sexy and hot gives porn a pass to deliver messages about
women that in any other form would be seen as completely unacceptable.
(Dines, 2010, pp. 87–8)
But Dines never really explains how or why pornography should be particularly good at
instilling such messages. (Note also that Dines comes close to denying that pornography’s
presuppostions ever need accommodating.) Eaton (2007; 2017) is the only philosopher I
know who does seriously address this question.
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pornography plays in effecting and sustaining women’s subordination
(see e.g. Vance and Snitow, 1984). But what I have been arguing here is
that L&W’s central claim survives this observation, important though it
may otherwise be.17
4 The Persistence Problem
Summarizing their discussion of silencing, L&W write: “Our sugges-
tion is that the presuppositions introduced by the pornographic con-
versations [e.g., that women do not always mean no by ‘No’] persist
in. . . conversations with real women” (L&W, p. 313). That these pre-
suppositions persist beyond the context in which they are introduced is
obviously essential. For suppose that viewers of misogynistic pornogra-
phy could simply discard its misogynistic presuppositions after engaging
with it. Then their being forced to accommodate those presuppositions
while viewing misogynistic pornography would have no effect on women
with whom they later interacted; those presuppositions would long since
have been forgotten.
In this section, then, we will consider what I shall call ‘the persistence
problem’: Why should we suppose that pornography’s presuppositions are
liable to persist beyond the local context in which they are introduced?
L&W do address a version of this problem, one that arises from the fact
that pornography is often fictional, and we’ll consider their discussion in
section 4.3. But the worry about persistence has deeper roots.
4.1 Presupposition as Local
In many of his discussions of presupposition, Stalnaker operates with
what he describes as a ‘simple model’ according to which the common
ground consists of mutually held beliefs (Stalnaker, 1974, p. 49; 2002,
p. 704): What I presuppose is what I believe we all believe.18 But, in
general, presuppositions are not beliefs (Stalnaker, 1974, p. 52; 2002, §5).
The most common counter-examples are explicit suppositions. “Suppose
Alex is a spy”, I might say, inviting you to reason with me under that
17 What may not survive it is the political significance of the claim. If, as I suggested
above, there is not much pornography that makes the sorts of misogynistic presupposi-
tions that L&W think are common, then eliminating misogynistic pornography (were
that possible) might not have much of an effect on gender inequality.
18 And what I believe we all believe we all believe, etc, so that the structure of presup-
position has a familiar iterative structure.
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supposition. Then, assuming you do join me, our conversation proceeds
until further notice with the presupposition that Alex is a spy in place.
Thus, it is now acceptable for you to say, “Then Sam must be a spy,
too”. The word “too” is a so-called presupposition trigger: Use of that
word is felicitious, in this case, only if it is presupposed that some other
conversationally relevant person is a spy. That this utterance is felicitous
shows that it really is being presupposed that Alex is a spy.
Other sorts of cases reinforce this point. Imagine Tony says to you,
“Jean doesn’t know that Alex is a spy”. Not yourself believing that Alex is
a spy, you might challenge them. But you might just decide to play along,
perhaps in an effort to learn more about Tony’s peculiar worldview. If
you do, then the presupposition that Alex is a spy is once again in effect,
this time through accommodation. The felicity of the question “Do you
think Sam might be a spy, too?” makes this plain.
One-sided ‘conversations’ will frequently exhibit this sort of struc-
ture. Imagine reading, on a certain sort of website, “Some people have
speculated that Michelle Obama was also born in Africa”. No one who
is familiar with recent American politics would need to pause over the
presupposition triggered by “also”. One knows exactly what is being
presupposed (that Barack Obama was born in Africa), and one can easily
accommodate that presupposition for the duration of the article. Of
course, one can also refuse to do so, but, if the author relies extensively
upon this presupposition, that may make it difficult for one to make
sense of what follows. In order to engage with the article, one has to play
along.
The terms usually used in this connection are “accept” and its cog-
nates (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 715). So, in the converations described a
couple paragraphs ago, we would be said to ‘accept’ that Alex is a spy.
But our accepting it amounts to different things in different cases, and
this technical notion of acceptance must be sharply distinguished from
nearby notions. Acceptance, in this sense, is in no way a dilute form of
belief.19 Supposition utterly lacks the ‘truth-directed’ character of belief,
and what you ‘accept’ in the context of a particular conversation can even
contradict what you actually believe, as two of the examples just given
show.
19 The notion of ‘acceptance’ is sometimes used this way in discussions of various
forms of instrumentalism: So one might ‘accept’ some scientific theory without actually
believing it and, in particular, without accepting the ontological claims it makes. The
notion of ‘acceptance’ needed in linguistic theory is not that notion.
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There is another way in which presuppositions differ from beliefs,
one that is even more important in the present context. One’s beliefs are
(in general) independent of any conversation in which one may happen
to be engaged. Presuppositions, by contrast, are (in general) local to a
given conversation. The examples given above once again illustrate this
point: We are making a supposition, or are playing along, only for the
duration of a certain conversation. So, as Stalnaker (2002, p. 716) puts
it, one’s presuppositions at a given time are what one is prepared to take
for granted for the purposes of the conversation in which one is engaged
at that time. The italicized qualification is essential. I am not prepared,
at any time, to take it for granted simpliciter that Alex is a spy. If I were,
I would contact the relevant authorities.
The simplified model encourages neglect of such subtleties. If what’s
presupposed is also believed, then presuppositons are not ‘local’. New
beliefs acquired through accommodation just do persist after the current
conversation ends, simply because they are new beliefs. But presupposi-
tions are not always believed, and the case in which they are not believed
is, as far as conversational dynamics are concerned, utterly unexcep-
tional: The same mechanisms that are at work when presuppositions
are believed are also at work when they are not believed. That was a
large part of Stalnaker’s point.20
It is not, of course, as if no presuppositions are trans-conversational.
Information gleaned through accommodation can and often will persist
beyond the local context. That is what happens, for example, in the
case mentioned earlier, in which you learn through accommodation
for whom Jean voted. But, in general, we cannot just assume that
presuppositions that are introduced through accommodation (or any
other mechanism) will persist beyond the local conversation, even when
the conversation is intended to be serious and factual rather than playful
or counterfactual.21
20 In one place, Langton (2012, p. 84) acknowledges this fact, but then dismisses its
significance, writing: “. . . [B]asically, on Stalnaker’s approach the shared common ground
is identified with certain belief-like propositional attitudes of the speakers. . . ”. But,
while acceptance is belief-like as opposed to desire-like or intention-like, it is not belief-
like in the way that matters here. In that sense, counterfactual supposition is also
belief-like.
21 Naomi Wieland (2007, pp. 443–5) raises a similar question, though in a very different
context. She offers Langton the view that, in pornography, the meaning of the word “No”
has actually changed: “No” literally means yes within pornography itself. There then
arises the question how that change spreads to (some) real-life sexual contexts. Wieland
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With all that in mind, then, let us return to the case of Fred, who has
not previously subscribed to rape myths but is now watching Behind the
Green Door. It may well be that, in order to engage with the film, he must
accommodate its presuppositions. In that sense, the film pulls Fred into
a world in which sexual violence is legitimate. But his ability to make
sense of the film does not depend upon his accepting its presuppositions
in any sense other than the technical one, and he need not accept those
presuppositions for any longer than the duration of the film. Indeed, Fred
might explicitly reject the truth of what the film presupposes and accept
its presuppositions only somewhat reluctantly.22 Indeed, many viewers
of pornography seem to be in this kind of position: They regard the
presuppositions made in much mainstream pornography as distasteful
(at best), but they are willing to go along with them because (i) they have
reasons to want to engage with pornography, and (ii) they are either
(a) unaware of the sort of pornography that at least strives to offer an
alternative to what is most readily available on the web,23 or (b) are for
some reason unable to access it.24
The point is not just that Fred can accept such presuppositions with-
out believing them, i.e., that viewers of pornography need not believe
what it presupposes. L&W can readily concede that not all viewings of
pornography result in women’s being (further) subordinated. The point,
rather, is that we cannot explain, e.g., why viewers of Green Door and sim-
ilar films regard some women’s attempts to refuse sex as insincere—that
is, why these films silence women—simply in terms of viewers’ having to
does tell a story about this, on Langton’s behalf, but, as Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate
McGowan (2010, §3) argue in their reply, it has all kinds of problems.
22 One might regard Fred’s willingness to accommodate such presuppositions as
morally problematic. Whether it is will depend upon how exactly he is engaging with
the film, an issue that is far too complex to discuss here. Related issues are discussed in
aesthetics under the title “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance” (see e.g. Gendler, 2000).
There are also very general issues in aesthetics about the relation between aesthetic
value and ethical value—often discussed under the label ‘immoralism’—that would also
be worth considering in this connection (see e.g. Carroll, 1996; Eaton, 2012b).
23 The cultural invisibility of ‘ethical pornography’ is a problem in its own right, but
not one I shall discuss further here—except to remark that one way to counteract the
negative social effects of pornography as it currently exists is, at least arguably, to
encourage and support queer and feminist pornography and the people making it (cf.
Eaton, 2017; French and Hamilton, 2018).
24 A student once remarked to me that, although she knew of such alternatives, they
seemed to be available only if one was willing to pay for them. To which I could only
respond, borrowing from Jiz Lee (2015), that ‘ethical porn starts when we pay for it’.
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accommodate the presupposition that “No” sometimes means yes.25 If
viewers merely accept this presupposition (in the technical sense) while
they are watching the film, and discard it thereafter, then there will be
no such effects. But that is what accommodating a presupposition is:
accepting it for the purposes of the conversation in which one is then
engaged.
4.2 McGowan on Conversation Exercitives
As we’ll see below, L&W probably do not intend to explain how porno-
graphy might “work in ways that are comparable to classic Austinian
illocutions” (Langton, 2012, pp. 82–3) simply in terms of presupposition
and accommodation. Mary Kate McGowan, however, does seem to want
to do so.26
McGowan (2003, p. 161) agrees with L&W that pornography silences
women by “enact[ing] permissibility conditions for the (heterosexual)
sociosexual arena”, thereby making certain conversational moves that
women might wish to make infelicitous (e.g., sexual refusal). McGowan
(2003, pp. 167–8) doubts, however, that pornographers have any special
authority of the sort that Langton and MacKinnon ascribe to them
(as we will discuss in section 5). She therefore sets out to argue that
pornography might enact the relevant norms anyway.
McGowan (2003, p. 169) first claims that every “conversational con-
tribution invoking a rule of accommodation changes the bounds of con-
versational permissibility”. The argument is brief:
Since rules of accommodation make the [conversational] score
automatically adjust27 so that what actually happens counts
as fair play, any conversational contribution that invokes a
rule of accommodation thereby changes the score. Since what
counts as fair play [e.g., felicitous assertion] depends on the
score, changing the score changes the bounds of conversa-
tional permissibility. (McGowan, 2003, p. 173)
Since pornography works through accommodation, then, engaging with
it must change what is conversationally permissible.
25 Just as a reminder: I do not necessarily agree that women are silenced in this way.
See note 14.
26 In a later paper, Langton (2012, pp. 83–4) seems to endorse McGowan’s approach.
27 This claim seems to depend upon there really being a rule of accommodation. It
also seems to ignore the fact that presuppositions can always be challenged, something
McGowan (2009, p. 396) elsewhere dismisses as a “complication”.
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In fact, however, accommodation has nothing to do with it: Every
utterance alters the conversational score, if only by entering into the com-
mon ground the presupposition that the utterance was made (Stalnaker,
2002, pp. 708–9). So every utterance alters the bounds of conversational
permissibility. This need not trivialize McGowan’s view, since, as she
puts it, “. . . we can be discriminating about exercitives by being discrimi-
nating about the permissibility facts enacted” (McGowan, 2003, p. 176).
That is, McGowan can reasonably insist that what is problematic about
pornography is not the mere fact that it enacts permissibility facts—all
utterances do so—but what kinds of permissibility facts it enacts. But
then it is hard to see that any real progress has been made: The problem,
as seen from within McGowan’s framework, was always to say what
kinds of permissibility facts pornography is able to enact. Does porno-
graphy only enact norms that affect pornographic conversations? Or is
it able to enact norms that affect women’s real-life sexual interactions
with men?
In explaining how, on her view, pornography might silence women,
McGowan offers the following example:28
. . . [C]onsider a pornographic scenario where the woman says
“No” but in which she is depicted as clearly communicating
her sexual consent. This type of pornography. . . might, in
some contexts, enact a norm such that saying “No” counts
as an insincere refusal (and cannot count as a sincere one).
(McGowan, 2017, p. 55)
But even if we assume that pornography can enact such a norm, why
should we suppose that it should apply outside the pornographic scenario
in question? The only permissibility facts an utterance is guaranteed
to affect are those concerning the permissible moves in the specific con-
versation of which it is a part. The point, once again, is not just that
the new norm need not persist. The point is that accommodating such a
norm only requires accepting it, in the technical sense, for the purposes
of the ‘pornographic conversation’ in which one is then involved. That is
what accommodation is. So we cannot explain how pornography enforces
28 It really isn’t clear what the problem is supposed to be if the woman has, indeed,
“clearly communicat[ed] her sexual consent”. Consent need not be verbally expressed,
and a verbal “No”, in the presence of a clear non-verbal “Yes”, might figure as part of a
role-play and be experienced as erotic by both partners. But then there are all kinds of
issues here about role-play, sexual fantasy, and the like, that we cannot consider here
(but see Kukla, 2018; Heck, 2020b).
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socio-sexual norms that silence real women simply in terms of the ab-
stract structure of conversational dynamics, as applied to ‘pornographic
conversations’ in which the real women affected by those norms are not
involved.
4.3 Challenging Presuppositions
As mentioned above, L&W address a form of the persistence problem in
their discussion of the fictional character of much pornography.29 Fiction
often proceeds against a ‘background’ of fact or, as L&W emphasize, of
purported fact. A reader who successfully identifies such background
‘facts’ can then learn something about the real world (e.g., how the streets
of London are laid out) or, potentially, mislearn falsehoods (e.g., that
women are socio-sexually inferior).
There should be no doubt that this kind of thing can happen. But, in
the present context, the observation raises at least as many questions
as it answers. Do pornographers actually make the sorts of “authorial
moves” required to make it evident to their readers that such ‘facts’ as
that women enjoy rape are supposed to be part of the factual background
(L&W, p. 316)? Probably it would be better to regard pornographers as
what L&W call “background blurrers” who instead fail to make the sorts
of “authorial moves which enable readers to distinguish background from
mere fiction”. If so, then it will presumably be possible for some viewers
to “mistake fiction for background, and learn what should not be learned”
(L&W, p. 317).
But what reason is there to suppose that a significant number of view-
ers do regard pornography’s misogynistic presuppositions as part of the
intended factual background? Even if some do, why should we suppose
that they will be inclined to accept pornographers’ judgements as gospel
(cf. Barker, 2014, p. 144)? L&W mock the ‘liberal’ view that pornography
aims to presuade its viewers of certain socio-sexual opinions, insisting
that “Pornography is designed to generate, not conclusions, but orgasms”
(L&W, p. 305).30 To be sure, little mainstream pornography aims to
29 Most pornography, I would argue, traffics not so much in fiction as in fantasy. The
difference between these two notions, which L&W (pp. 306, 314) conflate, becomes crucial
when the question is what pornography presupposes (cf. Liao and Protasi, 2013; Heck,
2020a), but we can set the matter aside here.
30 As Saul (2006a, p. 60, fn. 6) points out, pornography is not particularly effective, by
itself, at producing orgasms. The point will not matter here, but it will matter a great
deal when it comes time to think realistically about how people engage with pornography.
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alter its viewers’ opinions. But nor do people who watch pornography
typically do so in order to learn about the social status of women. Even
if viewers do “mistake fiction for background”, then, it is unclear why
doing so should lead them to “learn” anything at all. So the question
remains: What reason do we have to suppose that the presuppositions
that pornography introduces into the local context are liable to persist
beyond it?
At one point, L&W suggest that pornography’s power to “affect[] the
score of the sexual language game” might rest, in part, on “the nature
of presupposition itself, which—as we remarked earlier—is inherently
more difficult to challenge than outright assertion” (L&W, p. 313). There
is something to this thought, but L&W’s way of expressing it is at best
misleading. What they had said earlier was:
. . . [W]hen something is introduced as a presupposition it
may be harder to challenge than something which is asserted
outright. A speaker who introduces a proposition as a pre-
supposition thereby suggests that it can be taken for granted:
that it is widely known, a matter of shared belief among the
participants in the conversation, which does not need to be
asserted outright. . . . A challenger faces the cost of contradict-
ing not simply the speaker, but the general opinion. (L&W,
pp. 309–10)
What L&W say in the first sentence is, as we shall see below, correct.
But the claims that follow are false, at least if they are intended (as they
clearly are) as general remarks about “the nature of presupposition”.
Consider an example discussed above, in which you learn through
accommodation that Jean voted for Smith. Your informant need not sup-
pose that fact widely known; she may even know that it is not and choose
to convey it implicitly for that very reason.31 Many of the other sorts
of examples that commonly appear in the literature on accommodation
can be used to make the same point, for example, utterances involving
definite descriptions. If I say, “I can’t make the meeting because I have to
take my cat to the vet”, that presupposes that I have a cat. If you didn’t
already know that I have a cat, you will have to accommodate (unless you
31 Stalnaker (1974, p. 201) already describes the abstract structure of such cases,
though he does not give any specific examples. He wrongly supposes, however, that
the speaker must be pretending that the presupposed material is already part of the
common ground. It is part of what makes Lewis’s discussion important that he avoids
that trap.
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object). But the only sense in which I’m suggesting that it can be ‘taken
for granted’ that I have a cat is the technical sense discussed above. I
need not be suggesting that it is common knowledge that I have a cat.
What passes for ‘common knowledge’ typically is part of the common
ground. I do normally presume that other speakers will know who the
president of the United States is, what day it is, and so forth. But what’s
part of the common ground, in any given conversation, need not be widely
known (or even known at all). It needs, by definition, to be mutually
accepted, but only among the participants in the present conversation,
and only after it has been accommodated. So it is not true, even in quite
ordinary cases, that what is presupposed is widely known.
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which presuppositions are, in general,
more difficult than assertions to challenge, namely, that challenging
them requires redirecting the conversation.32 But that is all. It is not
as if it is especially difficult to say, “Did Jean really vote for Smith?” or
“I didn’t know you had a cat!”33 Nor is there anything conversationally
inappropriate about such statements. It’s just that making either would
amount to changing the subject, even if only briefly.
H. P. Grice (1989, p. 26) famously remarked that “. . . each participant
recognizes in [a given conversation], to some extent, a common purpose
or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction”. There
are ways in which this ‘conversational direction’ seems to track the
distinction between content that is asserted and content that is merely
presupposed. Someone who says “I wonder whether Jean regrets voting
for Smith” is, in effect, proposing to discuss Jean’s feelings about Smith’s
performance since the election, not Jean’s voting record (nor, for that
matter, the reasons for the speaker’s curiosity). That is what is ‘at-
issue’ in the speaker’s remark, to use the now current terminology.34 To
question ‘not-at-issue’ content—such as merely presupposed content—is
thus to shift the conversation away from the direction suggested by one’s
interlocutor.
32 This is sometimes called ‘derailing’, but that term has acquired a derogatory sense
nowadays that would be completely inappropriate to the phenomenon we are discussing
here.
33 Note how the special features of this case affect it. People do normally know whether
they have cats, so challenging the presupposition directly would involve an accusation
either of serious confusion or of lying.
34 This term seems to have been made popular by Christopher Potts (2015), who reports
that it is originally due to William Ladusaw.
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It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that there may be social costs
associated with challenging presupposed material. I seriously doubt that
these are great enough to do the work L&W need done, but we need not
pursue that question. For our purposes, it is irrelevant what is involved
in openly challenging presupposed material. The question we have been
discussing is what reason we have to believe that the presuppositions
introduced by pornography persist beyond the local context. As we saw
earlier, there is no requirement that one challenge presuppositions one
does not oneself believe, even in cases where it is clear that the speaker
does believe them, and even when the speaker seemingly expects you to
share their belief. One can just silently ‘accept’ those presuppositions for
the duration of the conversation and discard them when it is over.35
This point applies all the more in the case of ‘one-sided’ conversations,
such as viewing pornography. One can voice one’s rejection of a given
presupposition to oneself, as it were, but there are no social costs to
doing so. And, having done so, one can then simply accommodate the
presupposition—accept it, in the technical sense—and proceed. Nothing
in the ‘nature of presupposition’, then, will help us to understand how
pornography propagates its presuppositions beyond the local context.
5 Two Types of Authority
Following MacKinnon, L&W assume that pornography has special au-
thority concerning matters of gender and sexuality, and they indicate
that their “conclusion about pornography’s power to subordinate and
silence women requires th[is] premise about pornography’s authority”
(L&W, p. 306). It’s a natural suggestion, therefore, that L&W might
invoke pornography’s authority to explain how it propagates its misogy-
nistic presuppositions beyond the context of viewing.36
35 I have heard it suggested that at-issue content demands one’s cognitive attention,
so one might be less attentive to not-at-issue content and therefore be more inclined
to accept it without reflection. The question is, presumably, emprical, and my under-
standing is that there is no very strong evidence for this sort of claim (to say the least).
But, insofar as there is such a phenomenon, it is surely sensitive to how plausible the
presupposed content antecedently is: The presuppostion that the earth is flat will not
just be absorbed the way the presupposition that I have a cat is. That takes us back to
the sorts of worries discussed in section 3.
36 Langton (2012, p. 83) also describes McGowan’s view as differing from the one she
and West develop precisely because it does not require pornographers to have any special
authority.
21
Indeed, L&W seem to make something very much like this move
in their discussion of the fictional character of pornography: “Where
the background propositions in a fiction are partly false”, they write, “a
reader expecting authorial reliability on background propositions may
acquire false beliefs” (L&W, p. 316). So, the thought might be, porno-
graphy’s authoritative status with regard to gender and sexuality leads
viewers to trust its (implicit) pronouncements on those topics, and that
leads them to take its misogynistic presuppositions on board not just
while watching but more permanently.
It is much disputed whether pornography has any special authority.37
But set that aside. There is a serious danger of equivocation here. The
sort of authority that is important in the context of Langton’s analysis
of subordination and silencing is supposed to be comparable to that of a
judge or an umpire: someone who can, through a particular sort of speech
act, make something so. A reader who is “expecting authorial reliability”,
by contrast, is simply granting the author epistemic authority. As Louise
Antony (2017, pp. 79ff) has emphasized, however, this is authority in
entirely different sense.38
Langton (2017, p. 33) has recently acknowledged her prior neglect of
this distinction, but then proceeds to argue that its two sides are closely
enough connected for her purposes. Epistemic authority, she writes, “is
usually a felicity condition for the issuing of authoritative statements of
fact. . . (e.g., an umpire says ‘The ball is out’)”. But this example makes
Antony’s point for her. As John McEnroe would be happy to tell you, an
umpire’s incompetence, though it might eventually get them fired, is
not incompatible with their having the authority to declare a ball out.39
Such statements are authoritative only in a legalistic sense: As far as
further play is concerned, the ball was out, even if it clearly ought to
have been called in. Something similar is true in the case of another
example that Langton (2017, p. 33) discusses: Knowledge of medicine
is typically required for a medical license, but it is the license, not the
knowledge, that gives someone the authority to make it the case, just
by saying so, that someone may be supplied with otherwise prohibited
37 There is now a large literature on this issue. See e.g. Green (1998); Langton (1998);
Wieland (2007); Maitra and McGowan (2010).
38 I stumbled upon this point myself shortly before Antony’s paper was published.
Nancy Bauer (2015, pp. 79–80) comes close to making this same charge.
39 One of the greatest tennis players in history, McEnroe was famous for arguing with
the officials.
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drugs.40 In particular, the legal implications of a doctor’s prescription do
not depend upon the correctness of their diagnosis.41
Langton sometimes speaks as if pornographers are like the members
of the Marylebone Cricket Club, just with the power to decide the rules
of the ‘sexual language game’ rather than those of cricket. That is the
claim that, as I mentioned earlier, is much disputed.42 What I have
been arguing, in effect, is that Langton has conflated that claim with
a far more plausible one in the same vicinity: that (some) viewers of
pornography think that pornographers are simply better informed than
they are about certain subjects. Indeed, not even that much is required.
Perhaps what (many) viewers of pornography think is just that it conveys
the unvarnished truth about sexuality, whatever the attitudes of its
producers.43 But that is a claim that L&W’s opponents can freely accept.
Indeed, it is one they might want to emphasize.
Langton (2017, §2.4) spends a good deal of time arguing, with refer-
ence to a 2013 report from the UK Office of the Children’s Commissioner,
40 Langton does not say what sorts of verdictive or exercitive speech acts doctors (qua
doctors) can perform, but this one seems plausible. It certainly isn’t the case that a
doctor can, just by saying so, make it the case that someone has some disease or other
(though they can make it the case that someone has a certain diagnosis, which might be
important for insurance purposes).
41 Langton gives another example that has a different problem:
. . . [E]pistemic and practical authority coincide when a speaker enacts a
rule by credibly reporting that it is a rule (e.g., ‘In our house, lights out is
at 10p.m.’). . . : norms can be brought into existence by someone saying or
presupposing that they are already in place. (Langton, 2017, p. 33)
But, if I’m understanding the example correctly, no rule can be created by a mere report
that there is such a rule. The audience may be led to believe that there is such a rule
and so to behave as if there was. But that is a different matter: The speaker’s epistemic
authority gives them the power to shape others’ behavior in this way. Do not be misled
by the fact that the sentence “In our house, lights out is at 10p.m.” can be used by
someone with appropriate authority to establish such a norm. That use would not be a
mere report. Compare Antony (2017, pp. 70–1) on the difference between the constative
(descriptive) and verdictive uses of “I find the defendant not guilty”.
42 Maitra (2012) has developed an interesting proposal about how ‘informal’ authority
arises, applying it specifically to racist hate speech. Langton (2017, pp. 33–4) expresses
some enthusiasm for this suggestion, and Maitra’s work may well make it easier for us
to see how pornography could have some sort of authority. But the question at issue
here is what kind of authority pornography might have, and that is left untouched by
Maitra’s work.
43 This formulation (which I owe to Rachel Leadon) avoids the question, emphasized
by Saul (2006b, pp. 242–3), who are the agents of the speech acts allegedly performed
when pornography is viewed.
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that teenagers often look to pornography for information about sex—and
that what they ‘learn’ is not always what one would have hoped. But,
even if that is true,44 it simply does not follow that “. . . pornography is in
a real sense ‘the law’ for some. . . ” (Langton, 2017, p. 35). The most we
can conclude is that many teenagers are inclined to take at face value
what they see in pornography: to grant it a kind of epistemic authority
concerning gender and sexuality that it may well not deserve.
Adolescents are often starved for information about sex. What they
get at school, and very often at home (in contemporary English-speaking
societies, at least), is not just laughably inadequate but is not even di-
rected at the question to which they really want to know the answer: how
one actually has sex with someone (else). What passes for sex education,
when it is not just thinly veiled sex-shaming and fear-mongering, is
often limited to elementary biology and personal safety (see e.g. Pound
et al., 2016). Even what one might have regarded as basic anatomical
information—e.g., the function of the clitoris—is often omitted, for fear
that acknowledging that sex is pleasurable might send the wrong mes-
sage.45 Moreover, it should hardly be news that adolescents (and even
adults) sometimes fail to engage with media critically. So, even if we
do not know exactly why, it would hardly be surprising if some viewers
failed to appreciate that ‘porn sex’ is often very different from ‘real sex’
and so ‘learned’ unfortunate lessons.
I do not say that dismissively. On the contrary, I think we should take
seriously the idea that pornography has a kind of epistemic authority
about sexuality for some or even many viewers. Doing so might allow us
to explain some (though probably not all) of the harm that pornography
does. Fully developing this proposal would require a separate paper. But
it is worth our considering an example, if only by way of making it clearer
what kind of explanation is on offer and what strategies it suggests for
mitigating pornography’s harms.
44 A recent Canadian study found that increased exposure to pornography is correlated
with better knowledge of sexual anatomy and behavior (Hesse and Pedersen, 2017),
though it is not clear whether there is any causal relationship. (Nor is that clear in the
UK report.) And, as the USA’s experience with the report of the Meese Commission
taught (see e.g. Vance, 1992), it is worth being skeptical about reports on pornography
commissioned by socially conservative governments, especially reports identifed as ‘rapid
evidence assessments’ (cf. Barker, 2014, pp. 143–4).
45 Maggie Jones (2018) reports that, in an otherwise progressive class on sexual
education, one teacher’s attempt to talk about the function of the clitoris was cut off by
another. She had “inched across a line in which anatomy rested on one side and female
desire and pleasure on the other”.
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6 Pornography and Anal Intercourse
Breanne Fahs and Jax Gonzalez have argued that women’s experience
of receptive anal sex has much to teach us about the ways in which
gender inequality affects women’s sexual lives. For one thing, it helps
to make clear “the complicated relationships women have to consent—
including slippages such as partial or halfhearted consent. . . ” (Fahs and
Gonzalez, 2014, p. 514). Indeed, Fahs and Gonzalez often seem impatient
with the question whether the women in their study consented to anal
sex. Consent is a notion with primarily legal significance, whereas the
questions Fahs and Gonzalez want to ask are in some more general sense
ethical. Indeed, what most interest Fahs and Gonzalez are the harms
women suffer despite their consenting. But if there are such harms, and
I think there clearly are,46 then understanding how pornography has
affected women’s experience with anal sex may require us to ask more
refined questions than whether pornography has somehow legitimized
anal rape.
There has been a significant increase over the last couple decades
in the number of heterosexual women who have attempted receptive
anal intercourse (Herbenick et al., 2010, p. 256). There are probably
several reasons why, but, as Fahs and Gonzalez (2014, pp. 511–2) note,
it is not unreasonable to suppose that one of them is the frequency
with which anal sex occurs in mainstream pornography. The sort of
preparation that is typically required for anal intercourse is usually
edited out, however. I am not sure I would want to say that it is often
presupposed that no special preparation is required for anal sex. But it is
nonetheless easy to see how someone who naïvely regarded pornography
as, in relevant respects, an accurate presentation of what sex is ‘really
like’ might come to believe that anal intercourse is every bit as easy
and pleasurable for women as vaginal intercourse typically is, so that
no special preparation is required. If so, then pornography may be at
least somewhat responsible for the fact that many people try to engage
in anal intercourse without appropriate lubrication, something that
can be extremely painful for the receiving partner (Herbenick et al.,
2011, p. 207). Indeed, one Croatian study found that almost half the
46 There is now a significant literature on this topic. See, e.g., Gavey, 2005; Peterson
and Muehlenhard, 2007; Beres et al., 2014; Cahill, 2014; Thomas et al., 2017. The issue
burst onto the public scene in late 2017 with the publication of the short story “Cat
Person” in The New Yorker (Roupenian, 2017) and then a much discussed article in babe
just after the New Year (Way, 2018).
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women surveyed had to discontinue their first attempt at receptive anal
intercourse because it was too painful (Štulhofer and Ajdukovic´, 2011, p.
352).47
Yet more worryingly, many of Fahs and Gonzalez’s subjects report
having been prodded, pressured, or shamed into trying anal sex by
partners who have come to regard it as “a normal part of heterosexual
routines” (Fahs and Gonzalez, 2014, p. 511).48 The point here is not
(just) that pornography has de-stigmatized anal intercourse. That in
itself is not a bad thing. The thought, I take it, is that pornography
may have re-shaped our shared social understanding of what heterosex
generally involves and, thereby, the expectations and assumptions that
people bring to sexual encounters. That, in turn, affects the boundaries
of consent.
Suppose David and Susan have just met at a hotel bar and have
together retired to her room. Although each of them will have their own
sexual tastes and proclivities, they will typically share an understanding
of how their encounter might be expected to evolve: roughly, what sorts
of things each of them expects the other to do or not to do.49 All of
the activities in which they are about to engage will require consent,
of course, but some of the activities in which they might engage would
require special consent. For example, Susan might well expect that
David would welcome it if she performed oral sex on him. For her to
begin moving in that direction without explicitly asking would, I take it,
be quite a normal thing for a woman to do, expecting that, as she does so,
David will signal his interest or disinterest either bodily or verbally. But
for David to move as if to slap Susan’s face, or to put his hands around
her neck, or to start using degrading language towards her—those acts
seem different.50 These are things that some people enjoy, but they are
47 Fahs (2014, p. 282) misunderstands the question asked in the title of this paper:
“Should We Take Anodyspareunia Seriously?” The question is not whether we should take
seriously women’s experience of pain during receptive anal intercourse (that being what
anodyspareunia is). The question is whether anodyspareunia should be regarded as a
form of sexual dysfunction comparable to dyspareunia (pain during vaginal intercourse).
What makes that question important is its normative implications.
48 I take it that this does not undermine the claim that these women consented, in
a legal sense, though it well illustrates why Fahs and Gonzalez worry about an over-
reliance upon the notion of consent as a tool of ethical analysis.
49 What I have in mind here is related to, but probably not quite the same as, what are
known in the sociological literature as ‘sexual scripts’ (see e.g. Simon and Gagnon, 1986;
Frith and Kitzinger, 2001).
50 I’ll leave it to the reader to continue the list. Suffice it to say that much contemporary
pornography goes well beyond these limits (see e.g. Maddison, 2009). The point is not
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not the sorts of things one can just do, assuming that one’s partner will
speak up if that’s not what they want.
Similarly, changing orifices during intercourse is very different from
changing angles, speeds, or positions: It is not something one can just do.
A woman whose partner did so could reasonably claim to have been raped.
One cannot even just make as if to initiate anal intercourse, figuring
one’s partner will speak up if that’s not what they want. A woman whose
partner did so could, it seems to me, reasonably object that he had not
sought her consent in the way he should have; she might even suspect
that he was attempting to manipulate her into doing something ‘in the
moment’ to which she might not consent if she were explicitly asked.
Anal sex, then, requires ‘special consent’, but—and this is the crucial
point—that is a contingent feature of our society’s understanding of
heterosex. It is something that could change and that pornography could
contribute to changing. Social norms and expectations supervene on
individual attitudes, and, in our society, pornography probably does have
a significant effect upon individual attitudes about sexuality. Indeed,
there is some evidence that pornography has already done more than
just de-stigmatize anal intercourse. Fahs and Gonzalez report that some
of their subjects feel some cultural pressure to try anal sex due to their
own sense that it has become something that women are expected to do,
and so something that their (male) partners expect them to do, at least
once a relationship has become sufficiently serious (see also McBride,
2019). Fahs and Gonzalez then observe:
The complex ways that the cultural context produces interest
in anal sex (or the belief that most women engage in anal sex)
seems evident in these narratives, as peers and pornography
collide to create new norms about sexual behavior. (Fahs and
Gonzalez, 2014, p. 512, emphasis original)
Once again, creating new socio-sexual norms is not, in itself, a bad
thing. That is something feminists have been trying to do for a long time,
and with some success (see e.g. Ehrenreich et al., 1986). The problem
is that this particular change, though it affects women directly, has
occurred without much input from women. It seems, rather, to have
been the result of a discourse about sexuality that has largely excluded
that such activities are necessarily objectionable, but that ‘special consent’ is needed for
them, and that mainstream pornography rarely portrays any such consent as having
been given (see Blue, 2005).
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women’s perspectives, desires, and fantasies and that rarely foregrounds
women’s sexual pleasure (or, more generally, sexual experience), except
in cartoonish caricature.51
It may well be, then, that pornography shapes individual and so-
cial attitudes about gender and sexuality in ways that are contrary to
women’s interests. For example, pornography may be partly responsi-
ble for some heterosexual couples’ engaging in sexual interactions that
are excrutiatingly painful for the women involved. But, to explain how
pornography has such effects, we do not need to treat pornographers
as somehow akin to legislators or judges. Quite independently of por-
nography, women are socialized to cater to and defer to men, and men
are socialized to expect women to do so. Such gendered power dynamics
cannot but restrict and distort women’s (sexual) choices, even when they
do not wholly deprive women of (sexual) autonomy, because they subor-
dinate women’s (sexual) experience to men’s whims. If, to that toxic mix,
we add bad information and unrealistic expectations about anal sex, as
pornography arguably does, then the result is all too predictable.
But we still need to be careful how we assign blame. It is no doubt
true that pornography doesn’t teach people that, if anal sex is to be plea-
surable, then the receiving partner needs to learn how to relax muscles
over which they have no direct voluntary control (see e.g. Taormino, 2006,
esp. Ch. 2). But it was always a stupid idea to leave sex education to
pornography. Since that is what it has become, however, pornographers
should accept the responsibility that the freedom they cherish brings
with it.52 Still, it would be far less of a problem how pornography por-
trays sex if people didn’t respond so naïvely to that portrayal: regarding
it as documentary evidence of what sex is ‘really like’ rather than as a
(carefully edited) videographic portrayal of sexual fantasy.53 Compre-
hensive sex education that includes what has come to be called ‘porn
literacy’—skills and strategies for critically engaging with pornography
(see e.g. Tarrant, 2015; Lust and Dobner, 2017)—could do much to miti-
51 That is one of the ways in which feminist pornography strives to be different, and one
of the reasons that feminist pornography may actually be supportive of gender equality
(cf. Eaton, 2017; Heck, 2020b).
52 Some queer and feminist pornography eroticizes the preparation that is typically
needed for anal sex. One example is Erika Lust’s film “His Was First in My Ass”, from
XConfessions 6 (Lust Productions, 2016). Shine Louise Houston’s Crash Pad films also
generally include the necessary preparation when anal penetration is involved.
53 Or, if it is documentary evidence of something, then of the extraordinary abilities of
highly trained sexual athletes (an analogy that has become almost a cliché).
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gate pornography’s harms. It wouldn’t hurt to include honest information
about anal intercourse and other ‘non-normative’ sexual acts, either.54
More generally, rather than trying to discourage people from engaging
with pornography, we could instead encourage people to engage with it re-
sponsibly. But doing so requires us first to lift the shame that surrounds
the ‘use’ of pornography—a dismissive term that I have scrupulously
avoided—and to acknowledge, openly, that it actually is possible to en-
gage with pornography in ways that are healthy and thoughtful, as well
as pleasurable.55
References
Antony, L. (2011). ‘Against Langton’s illocutionary treatment of porno-
graphy’, Jurisprudence 2: 387–401.
(2017). ‘Be what I say: Authority versus power in pornography’, in
Mikkola 2017, 59–87.
Austin, J. L. (1962). How To Do Things With Words. Oxford University
Press.
54 As Štulhofer and Ajdukovic´ (2011, p. 347) sensibly put it: “The findings that a
substantial proportion of women reported pain at first and subsequent anoreceptive
intercourse highlight a need for more information and education about anal eroticism”.
55 Lectures based upon this material were presented at The Ohio State University,
the University of Texas, and the University of Rochester, and also to a meeting of the
Philosophy Graduate Forum at Brown University. Thanks to all those who attended for
their questions and comments, especially Paul Audi, Hayley Clatterbuck, Josh Dever,
Dana Howard, Megan Hyska, Harvey Lederman, Eden Lin, Tristram McPherson, Anne
Quaranto, and a couple other people whose names I was not able to determine.
Thanks also to Philip Bold, Alicia Gauvin, Nancy Weil, and Kayla Wingert for con-
versations that did much to shape this paper. Members of seminars I taught in Fall
2016 and Spring 2019 at Brown University helped me think through these issues, too,
especially Mark Benz, Yongming Han, Emily Hodges, and Margot Witte. Special thanks
to Willa Tracy for her work both in the seminars and in an independent study in Fall
2017, the results of which have since been pubilshed (Tracy, 2018); and to Rachel Leadon,
for her all but co-teaching the mentioned seminars and for the many conversations we
have had about sexual ethics.
Thanks to Louise Antony, Amy Berg, and Robert May for comments on drafts of the
paper. Thanks also to two anonymous referees whose comments did much to improve
the formulation of the central claim of the paper.
Finally, I owe a great debt to Anne Eaton, without whose support, encouragement,
and constructive criticism this paper might never have been conceived, let alone born.
29
Barker, M. (2014). ‘The “problem” of sexual fantasies’, Porn Studies 1:
143–60.
Bauer, N. (2015). ‘How to do things with pornography’, in How To Do
Things With Pornography. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press,
52–86.
Beirne, R. (2012). ‘Interrogating lesbian pornography: Gender, sexual
iconography, and spectatorship’, in Hines and Kerr 2012, 229–43.
Beres, M. A., Senn, C. Y., and McCaw, J. (2014). ‘Navigating ambivalence:
How heterosexual young adults make sense of desire differences’,
Journal of Sex Research 51: 765–76.
Blue, V. (2005). ‘Putting rough porn in context’. https://tinyurl.com/
BlueRough. Accessed 20 February 2019.
Cahill, A. J. (2014). ‘Recognition, desire, and unjust sex’, Hypatia 29:
303–19.
Carroll, N. (1996). ‘Moderate moralism’, British Journal of Aesthetics 36:
223–38.
Cohen, J. (1996). ‘Freedom, equality, pornography’, in A. Serat and T. R.
Kearns (eds.), ]ustice and Injustice in Law and Legal Theory. Ann
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 99–137.
Dines, G. (2010). Pornland. Boston, Beacon Press.
Dyer, R. (1985). ‘Male gay porn: Coming to terms’. Jump Cut: A Review
of Contemporary Media 30: https://tinyurl.com/DyerGayPorn.
Eaton, A. W. (2007). ‘A sensible antiporn feminism’, Ethics 117: 674–715.
(2012a). ‘What’s wrong with the (female) nude? A feminist perspec-
tive on art and pornography’, in Maes and Levinson 2012, 277–308.
(2017). ‘Feminist pornography’, in Mikkola 2017, 243–57.
Eaton, A. (2012b). ‘Robust immoralism’, The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism 70: 281–92.
Ehrenreich, B., Hess, E., and Jacobs, G. (1986). Re-Making Love: The
Feminization of Sex. New York, Anchor Books.
30
Fahs, B. (2014). ‘“Freedom to” and “freedom from”: A new vision for
sex-positive politics’, Sexualities 17: 267–90.
Fahs, B. and Gonzalez, J. (2014). ‘The front lines of the ‘back door’:
Navigating (dis)engagement, coercion, and pleasure in women’s anal
sex experiences’, Feminism & Psychology 24: 500–20.
French, I. M. and Hamilton, L. D. (2018). ‘Male-centric and female-centric
pornography consumption: Relationship with sex life and attitudes in
young adults’, Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy 44: 73–86.
Frith, H. and Kitzinger, C. (2001). ‘Reformulating sexual script theory:
Developing a discursive psychology of sexual negotiation’, Theory &
Psychology 11: 209–32.
Gavey, N. (2005). Just Sex? The Cultural Scaffolding of Rape. New York,
Routledge.
Gendler, T. S. (2000). ‘The puzzle of imaginative resistance’, The Journal
of Philosophy 97: 55–81.
Green, L. (1998). ‘Pornographizing, subordinating, silencing’, in R. C.
Post (ed.), Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation.
Los Angeles, Getty Research Institute, 285–311.
Grice, H. P. (1989). ‘Logic and conversation’, in Studies in the Ways of
Words. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 22–40.
Heck, R. K. (2020a). Does pornography presuppose rape myths?
Manuscript.
(2020b). How (not) to watch feminist pornography. Manuscript.
Herbenick, D., Reece, M., Hensel, D., Sanders, S., Jozkowski, K., and
Fortenberry, J. D. (2011). ‘Association of lubricant use with women’s
sexual pleasure, sexual satisfaction, and genital symptoms: A prospec-
tive daily diary study’, Journal of Sexual Medicine 8: 202–12.
Herbenick, D., Reece, M., Schick, V., Sanders, S., Dodge, B., and Forten-
berry, J. D. (2010). ‘Sexual behavior in the United States: Results from
a national probability sample of men and women ages 14–94’, Journal
of Sexual Medicine 7: 255–65.
31
Hesse, C. and Pedersen, C. L. (2017). ‘Porn sex versus real sex: How
sexually explicit material shapes our understanding of sexual anatomy,
physiology, and behaviour’, Sexuality & Culture 21: 754–75.
Hines, C. and Kerr, D., eds. (2012). Hard To Swallow: Hard-Core Porno-
graphy on Screen. New York, Wallflower Press.
Itzin, C. (1992). ‘“Entertainment for men”: What it is and what it means’,
in C. Itzin (ed.), Pornography: Women, Violence, and Civil Liberties.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 27–53.
Jackson, M. (1984). ‘Sex research and the construction of sexuality:
A tool of male supremacy?’, Women’s Studies International Forum 7:
43–51.
Jones, M. (2018). ‘What teenagers are learning from online porn’, The
New York Times Magazine. https://tinyurl.com/NYTTeenPorn. Pub-
lished in print on February 7, 2018.
Karttunen, L. (1974). ‘Presuppositions and linguistic context’, Theoretical
Linguistics 1: 181–94.
Kerr, D. (2012). ‘Lost in damnation: The progressive potential of Behind
the Green Door’, in Hines and Kerr 2012, 101–12.
Kukla, R. (2018). ‘That’s what she said: The language of sexual negotia-
tion’, Ethics 129: 70–97.
Langton, R. (1993). ‘Speech acts and unspeakable acts’, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 22: 293–330. Reprinted in Langton, 2009, Ch. 1.
(1998). ‘Subordination, silence, and pornography’s authority’, in R. C.
Post (ed.), Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation.
Los Angeles, Getty Research Institute, 261–84. Reprinted, shortened
and revised, in Langton, 2009, Ch. 4.
(2009). Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and
Objectification. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
(2012). ‘Beyond belief: Pragmatics in hate speech and pornography’,
in McGowan and Maitra 2012, 72–93.
(2017). ‘Is pornography like the law?’, in Mikkola 2017, 23–38.
32
Langton, R. and West, C. (1999). ‘Scorekeeping in a pornographic
language game’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 303–19.
Reprinted in Langton, 2009, Ch. 8.
Lee, J. (2015). ‘“Ethical porn” starts when we pay for it’. https://tinyurl.
com/JizLeeEthPorn. Accessed 20 February 2019.
Lewis, D. (1979). ‘Scorekeeping in a language game’, Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic 8: 339–59. Reprinted in Lewis, 1985, Ch. 13.
(1985). Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Liao, S. and Protasi, S. (2013). ‘The fictional character of pornography’,
in H. Maes (ed.), Pornographic Art and the Aesthetics of Pornography.
Palgrave-Macmillan, 100–18.
Lust, E. and Dobner, P. (2017). ‘The porn conversation’. http://
thepornconversation.org/. Accessed 20 February 2019.
MacKinnon, C. (1993). Only Words. Cambridge MA, Harvard University
Press.
Maddison, S. (2009). ‘“Choke on it, bitch!”: Porn studies, extreme gonzo
and the mainstreaming of hardcore’, in F. Attwood (ed.), Mainstream-
ing Sex. New York, I. B. Tauris, 37–54.
Maes, H. and Levinson, J., eds. (2012). Art and Pornography: Philosoph-
ical Essays. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Maitra, I. (2012). ‘Subordinating speech’, in McGowan and Maitra 2012,
94–120.
Maitra, I. and McGowan, M. K. (2010). ‘On silencing, rape, and responsi-
bility’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88: 167–72.
McBride, K. R. (2019). ‘Heterosexual women’s anal sex attitudes and
motivations: A focus group study’, Journal of Sex Research 56: 367–77.
McGowan, M. K. (2003). ‘Conversational exercitives and the force of
pornography’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 31: 155–89.
(2009). ‘Oppressive speech’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87:
389–407.
33
(2017). ‘On multiple types of silencing’, in Mikkola 2017, 39–58.
McGowan, M. K. and Maitra, I., eds. (2012). Speech and Harm: Contro-
versies Over Free Speech. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Mikkola, M., ed. (2017). Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytic
Feminist Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Miller, E. D. (2012). ‘Clean feet and dirty dancing: The erotic Pas de
Deux and Boys in the Sand’, in Maes and Levinson 2012, 205–20.
Minnesota Historical Society (2019). ‘Organizing Against Pornography:
An inventory of its organizational records at the Minnesota Historical
Society’. https://tinyurl.com/MHSOnOAP. Accessed 20 February 2019.
Parent, W. A. (1990). ‘A second look at pornography and the subordination
of women’, Journal of Philosophy 87: 205–11.
Patton, C. (1991). ‘Visualizing safe sex: When pedagogy and pornography
collide’, in D. Fuss (ed.), Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories.
New York, Routledge, 373–86.
Peterson, Z. D. and Muehlenhard, C. L. (2007). ‘Conceptualizing the
“wantedness” of women’s consensual and nonconsensual sexual experi-
ences: Implications for how women label their experiences with rape’,
Journal of Sex Research 44: 72–88.
Potts, C. (2015). ‘Presupposition and implicature’, in S. Lappin and C. Fox
(eds.), The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory, 2d edition.
Wiley-Blackwell, 168–202.
Pound, P., Langford, R., and Campbell, R. (2016). ‘What do young people
think about their school-based sex and relationship education? A
qualitative synthesis of young people’s views and experiences’. BMJ
Open : doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011329.
Roupenian, K. (2017). ‘Cat person’, The New Yorker. https://tinyurl.com/
NYCatPerson. Published in print on December 11, 2017.
Ryberg, I. (2015). ‘Carnal fantasizing: Embodied spectatorship of queer,
feminist and lesbian pornography’, Porn Studies 2: 161–73.
Saul, J. M. (2006a). ‘On treating things as people: Objectification, porno-
graphy, and the history of the vibrator’, Hypatia 21: 45–61.
34
(2006b). ‘Pornography, speech acts, and context’, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 106: 227–46.
Simon, W. and Gagnon, J. H. (1986). ‘Sexual scripts: Permanence and
change’, Archives of Sexual Behavior 15: 97–120.
Simons, M. (2003). ‘Presupposition and accommodation: Understanding
the Stalnakerian picture’, Philosophical Studies 112: 251–278.
Stalnaker, R. (1970). ‘Pragmatics’, Synthese 22: 272–89. Reprinted in
Stalnaker, 1999, Ch. 1.
(1974). ‘Pragmatic presuppositions’, in M. Munitz and P. Unger
(eds.), Semantics and Philosophy. New York, New York University
Press, 197–214. Reprinted in Stalnaker, 1999, Ch. 2.
(1999). Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech
and Thought. New York, Oxford University Press.
(2002). ‘Common ground’, Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 701–21.
Strawson, P. F. (1950). ‘On referring’, Mind 59: 320–44. Reprinted in
Strawson, 1971, Ch. 1.
(1971). Logico-Linguistic Papers. London, Methuen.
Strossen, N. (2000). Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the
Fight for Women’s Rights. New York, NYU Press.
Štulhofer, A. and Ajdukovic´, D. (2011). ‘Should we take anodyspareu-
nia seriously? A descriptive analysis of pain during receptive anal
intercourse in young heterosexual women’, Journal of Sex & Marital
Therapy 37: 346–58.
Taormino, T. (2006). The Ultimate Guide to Anal Sex for Women, 2d
edition. San Francisco, Cleis Press.
Tarrant, S. (2015). ‘Pornography and pedagogy: Teaching media liter-
acy’, in L. Comella and S. Tarrant (eds.), New Views On Pornography:
Sexuality, Politics, and the Law. Santa Barbara CA, Praeger, 417–30.
Thomas, E. J., Stelzl, M., and Lafrance, M. N. (2017). ‘Faking to finish:
Women’s accounts of feigning sexual pleasure to end unwanted sex’,
Sexualities 20: 281–301.
35
Tracy, W. M. (2018). ‘Backward and in high heels’, A Priori: The Brown
Journal of Philosophy, 3. https://tinyurl.com/APriori3.
van Brabandt, P. (2017). ‘In/egalitarian pornography: A simplistic view
of pornography’, in Mikkola 2017, 221–42.
van Brabandt, P. and Prinz, J. (2012). ‘Why do porn films suck?’, in Maes
and Levinson 2012, 161–90.
Vance, C. S. (1992). ‘Negotiating sex and gender in the Attorney General’s
Commission on Pornography’, in L. Segal and M. McIntosh (eds.), Sex
Exposed: Sexuality and the Pornography Debate. New Brunswick, NJ,
Rutgers University Press, 29–49.
Vance, C. S. and Snitow, A. B. (1984). ‘Toward a conversation about sex
in feminism: A modest proposal’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 10: 126–35.
Way, K. (2018). ‘I went on a date with Aziz Ansari. It turned into the
worst night of my life’, babe. https://tinyurl.com/BabeAnsari. Accessed
20 February 2019.
Wieland, N. (2007). ‘Linguistic authority and convention in a speech
act analysis of pornography’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85:
435–56.
Williams, L. (1989). Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the ‘Frenzy of the
Visible’. Berkeley CA, University of California Press.
Young, D. R. (2017). ‘Gag the Fag, or tops and bottoms, persons and
things’, Porn Studies 4: 176–92.
36
